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Yoshihara: China, Fragile Superpower
BOOK REVIEWS

Chinese states were using “all elements of
national power” several millennia ago.)
The reader can conclude from this work
that Chinese military thought places deception on an equal level with fire and
maneuver. In this it differs from Western
military thought, which fundamentally
considers deception as “unsportsmanlike” and relegates it to the operational
and intellectual fringes. Deception and
unorthodox approaches afford ways for
the inferior to defeat the superior force.
The “stronger” force, as judged by conventional military standards, is not necessarily more likely to win in battle.
Rather, the force that applies the orthodox and the unorthodox in a way that
fits the situation better is more likely to
prevail. The book abounds with examples of how a little deception or unconventional application can have a great
effect on outcomes.
The relationship between military operations and statecraft is another fundamental thread through this book.
Subversion of an enemy state begins
well before military conflict, and ideally
it makes conflict unneeded. Bribery, assassination (both physical and character), dissension, and distraction are all
basic tools of statecraft, as well as of war.
Fundamentally, Chinese thought makes
no real distinction between the two.
The final chapters address the ongoing
renaissance of traditional Chinese military thought in the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA). The once-despised classic
works are now widely used in PLA
institutions.
Several years ago, two PLA officers published a book, Unrestricted Warfare,
that describes unconventional approaches for defeating a superior force.
In light of Sawyer’s new work, Western
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scholars should reinterpret Unrestricted
Warfare. Rather than being an exception to PLA military thought, it may
well reflect current, core thinking.
Sawyer argues that “China has a lengthy
heritage of conceiving and implementing systemic programs for subverting
other states.” It would be interesting for
scholars of contemporary Chinese diplomacy to compare the “active measures” stratagems outlined in the book
against current U.S.-China events.
This book reads well. A dynastic chronology helps place the events in historical (Chinese, if not world) context.
However, maps would have greatly assisted understanding.
JOHN R. ARPIN

Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)
Centreville, Virginia

Shirk, Susan. China, Fragile Superpower: How
China’s Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful
Rise. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007.
336pp. $27

According to Susan Shirk, China suffers
terribly from the “wag the dog” syndrome. Shirk argues rather persuasively
that China is saddled with a host of internal problems, ranging from widespread social unrest to rampant political
corruption, that have sharply intensified insecurities among Chinese leaders
with respect to their hold on power.
Such perceptions of vulnerability have
in turn heightened Chinese sensitivities
to slights by Japan, Taiwan, and the
United States, slights that accordingly
threaten to arouse potentially uncontrollable national passions and, in the
process, stimulate regime-toppling impulses at home. For Shirk, this volatile

1

Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 1, Art. 15
134

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

nexus of domestic and foreign pressures
means trouble for regional stability in
Asia. As Chinese citizens increasingly
scrutinize Beijing’s relations with the
outside world, the Chinese Communist
Party can ill afford to look soft on
hot-button foreign policy questions.
The party’s obsession with internal stability thus compels Beijing to guard vigilantly against foreign insults to China’s
national honor—a critical source of the
regime’s legitimacy. Consequently,
more than ever before, Beijing is
primed to overreact to external crises
and trigger confrontations that might
otherwise have been averted by more
temperate responses.
Overall, Shirk makes a compelling case
about this peculiar dilemma that
Beijing confronts. Although the proposition that the international community
ought to be more concerned about
China’s weaknesses rather than its
strengths is not new, her coverage of its
domestic challenges is quite informative. In particular, Shirk provides a useful framework for understanding
Beijing’s internal priorities—leadership
unity, social harmony, and tight control
of the military—that would be instantly
recognizable to those familiar with
Clausewitz’s famous “paradoxical trinity.” The analysis of China’s prickly ties
with Japan, Taiwan, and the United
States, however, covers well-trodden
ground, material that has been widely
documented in other studies.
As a former deputy assistant secretary
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Shirk writes with authority on
U.S. diplomatic encounters with the
Chinese during the Clinton administration. Her extensive interviews with Chinese policy makers, senior military
officers, scholars, students, and “netizens”
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not only attest to the unusual degree of
access she has accumulated during her
tenure but enliven the narrative with
fascinating vignettes.
Nevertheless, this study is hobbled by
an apparent reluctance to revisit basic
assumptions about the regime itself,
which, after all, the author contends, is
fragile. Shirk does not render crucial
judgments about the viability of
China’s regime-sustaining strategies,
vaguely observing that “[Beijing] may
be capable of surviving for years to
come so long as the economy continues
to grow and create jobs.” Thus the validity of the book’s findings rests almost
entirely on the premise that the Chinese
Communist Party in its current form
will endure indefinitely. The analytical
consequences of this unwillingness to
explore alternative futures are evident
from the author’s boilerplate policy
prescriptions for the United States, including an injunction that Washington
must live with China’s repressive domestic policies.
But what if Shirk’s cautious optimism
about the regime’s longevity is wrong?
This unsettling question awaits another
forward-thinking China watcher.
TOSHI YOSHIHARA

Forest Hills, New York

Alexander, Yonah, ed. Counterterrorism Strategies:
Successes and Failures of Six Nations. Dulles, Va.:
Potomac Books, 2006. 283pp. $24
Zimmermann, Doron, and Andreas Wenger,
eds. How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics
in the West. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,
2006. 269pp. $55

Since the attacks of 11 September, a
kind of conventional wisdom about
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